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Abstract
In this note, we provide critical commentary on two articles that cast doubt on the
validity and implications of Birnbaum’s theorem: Evans (2013) and Mayo (2014). In our
view, the proof is correct and the consequences of the theorem are alive and well.
1 Introduction
Birnbaum’s theorem (Birnbaum, 1962) states that two statistical principles that are intuitively
reasonable, the weak conditionality principle and the sufficiency principle, imply the likeli-
hood principle, which is violated by statistical procedures such as p-values or reference priors.
Ever since the result was published, there has been a lively discussion on its validity and
implications. The monograph Berger and Wolpert (1988) contains a defense of the likelihood
principle and responses to criticisms up to the date it was published, but the flow of articles has
not stopped in the fields of statistics and philosophy of science (for example, Helland (1995),
Bjørnstad (1996), Robins and Wasserman (2000), Sweeting (2001), Wechsler et al. (2008),
Grossman (2011), Gandenberger (2014)). Somewhat recently, the articles Evans (2013) and
Mayo (2014) have cast doubt on the validity and implications of Birnbaum’s theorem, and
the goal of this note is to review and discuss their content.
First, we introduce our basic notation and definitions for statistical experiment, inference
bases, and informative inference:
• Statistical experiment: A triplet E = {XE ,ΘE , pθ,E}, where XE is the sample space
of the experiment, ΘE is the parameter space, and pθ,E is the sampling distribution of
E for θ ∈ Θ. As it is usual in the literature, we avoid measure-theoretical details by
considering experiments with a discrete support (see Section 3.4 in Berger and Wolpert
(1988) for generalizations).
• Inference base: A tuple (E, x) where E is a statistical experiment and x ∈ XE is an
outcome from E.
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• Informative inference: Ev(E, x) is the informative inference (or conclusion) made
by an agent given (E, x). If I is the space of inference bases, one can think of Ev as a
function from I to a set D of possible inferences.
• Inferentially equivalent: Two inference bases (E, x) and (E′, x′) are inferentially
equivalent if Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) (the same inferences are made given (E, x) or
(E′, x′)).
Given the definitions above, we define the statistical principles at stake: the weak conditional-
ity principle (WCP), ancillarity principle (AP), sufficiency principle (SP), and the likelihood
principle (LP):
• Weak Conditionality Principle (WCP): Consider the statistical experiments E1 =
(XE1 ,Θ, pθ,E1), E2 = (XE2 ,Θ, pθ,E2) and a 50-50 mixture between E1 and E2, which
we denote Emix. Conceptually, one can imagine that a fair coin is tossed: if it lands
heads, E1 is performed; if it lands tails. E2 is performed. Formally, the outcome of
the mixture experiment will be a pair (j, x), where j indicates the experiment that
was performed (j = 1 if E1 was performed, and j = 2 if E2 was performed instead),
and x ∈ XE1 ∪ XE2 is the outcome of the experiment that was performed. WCP states
that the informative inference given (Emix, (j, x)) from the mixture experiment should be
equal to the informative inference given the inference base of the component experiment
(Ej , x); that is, Ev(Emix, (j, x)) = Ev(Ej , x).
• Ancillarity Principle (AP): Let U be an ancillary statistic for θ (the distribution
of U does not depend on θ) for which the value u is observed. Then, Ev(E, (u, x)) =
Ev(E|U=u, x), where the sampling distribution associated with E|U=u is pθ,E|U=u(·) (the
conditional probability mass function of x given U = u). In words, the ancillarity prin-
ciple states that conditioning on an ancillary statistic should not change our informative
inference. This principle is also known as the (strong) conditionality principle. Clearly,
the selection of the component in WCP is an example of an ancillary statistic, so AP
implies WCP.
• Sufficiency Principle (SP): If (E, x) and (E, x′) are such that T (x) = T (x′) for a
sufficient statistic T for θ, then Ev(E, x) = Ev(E, x′).
• Likelihood Principle (LP): If (E, x) and (E′, x′) are such that pθ,E(x) = c pθ,E′(x
′)
for c > 0 that does not depend on θ, then Ev(E, x) = Ev(E, x′).
In our framework, Ev can be any function from the space of inference bases to inferences,
and the mathematical role of statistical principles is restricting the set of functions that one
is allowed to use. As explained in more detail in Section 2, Evans’ objections arise because
a map Ev is not introduced. Conversely, in Section 3 we show that the definition of the
sufficiency principle in Mayo (2014) is different from SP (as defined in the paragraph above)
and blocks Birnbaum’s proof.
2 Evans’ objections
Evans defines the statistical principles as the following set relations on I × I:1
• C: (E, x) ∼C (E
′, x′) if and only if E = Emix, x = (j, xj), E
′ = Ej , and x
′ = xj as in
the definition of WCP in Section 1 (or with roles of (E, x) and (E′, x′) reversed).
• A: (E, x) ∼A (E
′, x′) if and only if x = (u, x′) and E′ = E|U=u, where U = u and E|U=u
are as defined for AP in Section 1 (or with roles of (E, x) and (E′, x′) reversed).
• S: (E, x) ∼S (E
′, x′) if and only if there exists a sufficient statistic T for θ such that
T (x) = T (x′).
• L: (E, x) ∼L (E
′, x′) if and only if pθ,E(x) = c pθ,E′(x
′) for a constant c > 0 which does
not depend on θ.
This approach is different from the one taken in Section 1 and the one in Birnbaum (1962)
because Ev is not defined or used at all in the definitions. Nonetheless, the set relations are
very similar to the principles defined in Section 1: they are of the form (E, x) ∼P (E
′, x′) if
and only if Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) by an application of a principle statistical P . According
to Evans, “A basic step missing in Birnbaum (1962) was to formulate the principles as rela-
tions on the set I of all model and data combinations.” But the definition of a function Ev
automatically induces an equivalence relation on I × I (the kernel of Ev): (E, x) ∼ (E, x′)
if and only if Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′). If we accept WCP and SP as defined in Section 1, the
equivalence relation on I × I induced by accepting WCP and SP implies that bases with
proportional likelihoods are equivalent because they map to the same value.
Evans shows that statistical principles defined as set relations need not be equivalence rela-
tions (for instance, A and C as defined above are not). Even if two statistical principles are
equivalence relations, their union may not be because it could fail to be transitive: if P1 and
P2 are set relations formalizing statistical principles, it is possible that the inference bases
1We use a slightly different notation than in Evans (2013). We define C as a formalization of WCP and
A as a formalization of AP. However, Evans (2013) does not consider WCP at all and defines a set relation
(which is denoted C in Evans’ article) which is equivalent to our A. We apologize for the possible confusion
that this change might cause.
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(E1, x1) and (E2, x2) are inferentially equivalent with respect to P1 and (E2, x2) and (E3, x3)
are inferentially equivalent according to P2 but (E1, x1) and (E3, x3) are not inferentially
equivalent according to either P1 or P2 alone.
Birnbaum’s argument is a neat (and in our view, transparent) illustration of this phenomenon:
the inference bases with proportional likelihoods are shown to be equivalent by a chain of
applications of WCP and SP, but they are not equivalent according to either WCP or SP
individually. This implies that L 6= S∪C. The correct result is that L is equal to the smallest
equivalence relation generated by S∪C, and Evans argues that extending statistical principles
that are originally defined as set relations to equivalence relations requires further justification.
Here is a simple one: if we define the sufficiency principle and the weak conditionality principle
as the set relations S and C and introduce a function Ev with the minimal requirement that
Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) if and only if (E, x) ∼C (E
′, x′) or (E, x) ∼S (E
′, x′), the equivalence
relation on I × I generated by Ev is precisely the smallest equivalence relation generated by
S ∪ C, which in this case is L. In general, if we define statistical principles P1, P2, ... , Pk as
set relations on I ×I and introduce Ev with the property Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) if and only
if (E, x) ∼Pi (E
′, x′) for some i ∈ {1, 2, ... k}, the equivalence relation on I ×I induced by Ev
is equal to the smallest equivalence relation generated by P1, P2, ... , Pk. Defining statistical
principles as set relations on I ×I and introducing Ev as we just did is equivalent to stating
the definitions in terms of Ev in the first place as in Section 1.
Since the notation Ev is very explicit in Birnbaum (1962), we believe that the definition of
the principles in terms of set relations was implied by the fact that Ev is a function. But even
within a framework where Ev is not defined, the smallest equivalence relation generated by a
collection of principles has a straightforward interpretation: its elements are (exclusively) the
result of a chain of applications of the principles we wish to respect. Rejecting the extension
implies rejecting the equivalence of inference bases that can be shown to be equivalent by a
number of applications of our principles. We believe, then, that the extension is also justified
if Ev is not introduced.
Now we turn to an example in Evans (2013) that shows that A is not transitive and illustrates
some of the issues that were commented in the paragraphs above.
Example 1. (Evans (2013), pg. 2651) Let XE = {1, 2}×{1, 2}, ΘE = {1, 2}, with pE,θ given
in Table 1. Both U(x1, x2) = x1 and V (x1, x2) = x2 are ancillary, and the conditional models
upon observing U = 1 and V = 1 are given in Tables 2 and 3. This example shows that A
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is not transitive: (E, (x1, x2)) ∼A (E|U , x2) and (E, (x1, x2)) ∼A (E|V , x1), but (E|U , x2) 6∼A
(E|V , x1) because there is no ancillary statistic linking the two conditional models. However,
using the definitions in Section 1 (or equivalently, using A and introducing Ev with the
property Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) if and only if (E, x) ∼A (E
′, x′)), we have Ev(E, (x1, x2)) =
Ev(E|U , x2) and Ev(E, (x1, x2)) = Ev(E|V , x1), so Ev(E|U , x2) = Ev(E|V , x1).
Table 1: Unconditional model (rows: sampling distributions for θ ∈ {1, 2})
(x1, x2) (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
fE,θ=1(x1, x2) 1/6 1/6 2/6 2/6
fE,θ=2(x1, x2) 1/12 3/12 5/12 3/12
Table 2: Conditional model when U = 1 (rows: sampling distributions for θ ∈ {1, 2})
(x1, x2) (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
fE,θ=1(x1, x2 | U = 1) 1/2 1/2 0 0
fE,θ=2(x1, x2 | U = 1) 1/4 3/4 0 0
Table 3: Conditional model when V = 1 (rows: sampling distributions for θ ∈ {1, 2})
(x1, x2) (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
fE,θ=1(x1, x2 | V = 1) 1/3 0 2/3 0
fE,θ=2(x1, x2 | V = 1) 1/6 0 5/6 0
Quoting Evans (2013): “Saying that such models [the conditional models in Tables 2, 3]
contain an equivalent amount of statistical information is clearly a substantial generalization
of [A]. To measure the accuracy of this estimate we can compute the conditional probabilities
based on the two inference bases, namely,
Pθ=1(θ̂ = 1 | U = 1) = 1/2, Pθ=2(θ̂ = 1 | V = 1) = 3/4
and so the accuracy of θ̂ is quite different depending on whether we [condition on U or V ].
It seems unlikely that we would interpret these inference bases as containing an equivalent
amount of information in a frequentist formulation of statistics.”
Concluding that the inference bases are equivalent with respect to A is a consequence of
introducing Ev with the property Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) if and only if (E, x) ∼A (E
′, x′).
Also, the likelihood ratio of θ = 1 to θ = 2 equals 2 if we condition on either U or V , which
is unsurprising because, as Evans proves, AP equals LP. We agree with Evans in that this
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example shows that accepting AP can be problematic for frequentist statisticians: there are
two ancillary statistics we can condition on, there is no apparent reason one should prefer one
over the other and, unfortunately, standard errors and p-values depend depend on the choice
of ancillary. We return to this point in Section 4.
After showing that AP is equivalent to LP, Evans concludes that SP is redundant in Birn-
baum’s argument. Then, Example 1 leads him to cast doubt on the impact of Birnbaum’s
result because he believes that many statisticians would not accept AP (or equivalently, A
and the equivalences generated by the principle). But SP is certainly not redundant if only
WCP is assumed (recall that WCP only requires equivalence of 50-50 mixtures), and WCP
and SP also imply LP. In Example 1, the conditional experiments are not equivalent according
to WCP, and the smallest equivalence relation containing C would only add cases where mix-
ture experiments with different components (or different probabilities of performing them)
were considered, but the same component experiment was performed and the same result
was obtained. Finally, we agree with Evans that accepting statistical principles may induce
unexpected equivalences between inference bases, which is precisely what makes Birnbaum’s
result surprising and relevant.
3 Mayo’s objections
In our view, the objections to Birnbaum’s proof in Mayo (2014) stem from using a definition for
the sufficiency principle that is different from that in Section 1. We believe that introducing
new notation that makes an explicit distinction between the output of methods and the
inference made by an agent that is using them is helpful for understanding the arguments:
• M(E, x): Result of a applying a method M to the inference base (E, x).
• Ev(E, x): Inference made by an agent given (E, x) (as in Section 1).
Given (E, x), the agent makes informative inferences Ev(E.x) by means ofM(E′, x′) for some
(E′, x′) which may not be equal to (E, x). The interpretation of M(E, x) =M(E′, x′) is that
the “output” of applying a method M to (E, x) and (E′, x′) is the same (one can imagine
that M is a function in some programming language that takes E and x as inputs), whereas
Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) means that an agent makes the same informative inferences given
(E, x) or (E′, x′). This distinction is somewhat obscured in Mayo (2014), as she defines
• InfrE[x]: The parametric statistical inference from a given or known (E, z).
• (E′, x′) ⇒ InfrE [x]: An informative parametric inference about θ from given (E, x) is
to be computed by means of InfrE[x].
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The definition of InfrE [x] and the name “Infr” suggest that InfrE[x] = Ev(E, x). However,
the second definition implies that InfrE [z] need not be equal to the final inference Ev(E, x).
This is explicit in her definition of the weak conditionality principle (WCP):
• WCP: Given (Emix, (j, xj)), condition on the Ej producing the result: (Emix, (j, xj))⇒
InfrEj [xj ]. Do not use the unconditional formulation: (Emix, (j, xj)) 6⇒ InfrEmix[(j, xj)].
Using our notation, this definition is equivalent to the WCP in Section 1. However, Mayo
defines the sufficiency principle as follows
• SP2: If there exists a sufficient statistic T for θ and T (x) = T (x′), then InfrE[x] =
InfrE[x
′],
which is different from SP, and can be recast as
• SP2: If there exists a sufficient statistic T for θ and T (x) = T (x′), then M(E, x) =
M(E, x′).
The key point is that WCP is a property of Ev and SP2 is a property ofM. If this distinction
is made, LP does not follow. The distinction between Ev and M is not made in Birnbaum
(1962) or Section 1. The following example, which is a slight modification of the example
presented in Section 4. in Mayo (2010), puts the notation in context and makes clear why
WCP and SP2 do not imply LP.
Example 2. Consider binomial and negative binomial experiments
E1 = {{0, 1, 2, ... , n}, Θ, Binomial(n, θ)}, E2 = {{0, 1, 2, ....}, Θ, NegBinomial(k, θ)}.
Suppose that a fair coin is flipped and E1 is performed if the coin lands heads and E2 is
performed if it lands tails. Let Emix denote the “mixture” experiment. The outcome of
Emix is (j, x), with j ∈ {1, 2} (j = 1 if E1 is performed and j = 2 if E2 is performed) and
x = (k, n − k), where k and n − k are the number of successes and failures observed after
performing Ej . The statistical method M(E, x) is the one-sided p-value for testing θ = θ0
against θ > θ0:
M(E1, x) = P(Binomial(n, θ0) ≥ x)
M(E2, x) = P(NegBinomial(r, θ0) ≥ x)
M(Emix, x) = 0.5P(Binomial(n, θ0) ≥ x) + 0.5P(NegBinomial(k, θ0) ≥ x).
We assume that the agent makes inference using the rule Ev(Emix, (j, x)) = M(Ej , x). The
statistic T (j, x) = (1, x) is sufficient for θ with respect to Emix, and it satisfies both T (1, x) =
T (2, x) and M(Emix, (1, x)) = M(Emix, (2, x)), so SP2 is respected. WCP is automatically
satisfied because the inference rule is Ev(Emix, (j, x)) =M(Ej , x) = Ev(Ej , xj) (the inference
rule is chosen so that WCP is respected). It follows that WCP and SP2 do not imply LP.
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According to the definitions in Mayo (2014), WCP and SP2 do not imply LP, as seen in the
example above. Where does Birnbaum’s proof go wrong? With WCP as stated, the mixture
experiments are inferentially equivalent to the performed components: Ev(Emix, (1, x1)) =
Ev(E1, x1) andEv(Emix, (2, x2)) = Ev(E2, x2). However, SP2 does not implyEv(Emix, (1, x1))
= Ev(Emix, (2, x2)): instead, it requires M(Emix, (1, x1)) = M(Emix, (2, x2)). However,
Ev(Emix, (1, x1)) need not be equal to Ev(Emix, (2, x2)). These definitions allow Mayo to
claim that, in Example 2, reporting the conditional p-value according to the sampling dis-
tribution of the component experiment that was performed does not violate the sufficiency
principle. In contrast, reporting the conditional p-value is a violation of SP as defined in
Section 1 (and the proof of WCP and SP implies LP goes through as usual). Critically, note
that SP states that if there exists a sufficient statistic, the inferences bases are inferentially
equivalent, but there is no requirement that said sufficient statistic be used for our final in-
ferences. If that were the case, it would imply that SP instructs to use of the unconditional
p-value. The reason that Birnbaum’s proof does not go through in this framework hinges on
the distinction of Ev and M: if we define a new WCP2 as a property of M (so that both
SP2 and WCP2 were properties of M), reporting the conditional p-value in Example 2 would
violate WCP2, as M(Ej , xj) 6=M(Emix, (j, xj)) (and WCP2 and SP2 would, of course, imply
a version of LP written in terms of M).
4 Can AP be applied in frequentist statistics?
We briefly discuss the applicability of the ancillarity principle in frequentist inference, mo-
tivated by comments in Cox and Mayo (2010), Evans (2013), and Mayo (2014). Since AP
is equivalent to LP, frequentist statisticians that want to make conditional frequentist state-
ments have to propose restricted versions of AP. Additionally, it is of utmost importance to
find well-defined criteria for choosing among ancillaries because, as we have seen in Example 1,
there are instances where there are multiple ancillaries one can condition on that give rise
to different conditional p-values or standard errors. Some authors have proposed restricting
the set of ancillaries to condition on (Durbin (1970), Kalbfleisch (1975)), but this approach is
problematic because there are examples where several ancillaries satisfy the restrictions (see
Basu (1964) for examples and Dawid (2011) for a concise and lucid review on the ancillar-
ity principle and the issues that have been mentioned in this paragraph). To the best of our
knowledge, there is no (restricted) formulation of AP that instructs which ancillary one should
use for any given problem, and as a result is no adequate definition for a restricted ancillarity
principle that is not equivalent to the likelihood principle (Cox (1971) provides a heuristic
that works when applied to an example in Basu (1964), but it does not give a definite answer
in other problems and it is not regarded as a general solution to this problem). Another issue
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is that there are examples where a conditional analysis is clearly desirable, but useful ancillary
statistics are not available. We present two examples below.
Example 3. (Example 8 in Berger and Wolpert (1988)) Let Θ = [0, 1), P (X = θ) = 1−θ, and
P (X = 0) = θ. Consider the confidence set C = {X}. Unconditionally, P (θ ∈ C) = 1 − θ.
However, if X > 0, we know that C = {X} contains θ with probability 1, but X is not
ancillary, so the ancillarity principle would not allow conditioning on its value.
Example 4. Let X1,X2 be independent and identically distributed random variables with
P (Xi = θ − 1) = P (Xi = θ + 1) = 1/2 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let D = |X1 − X2|/2, which is
ancillary with P (D = 1) = P (D = 0) = 1/2. Suppose we want to evaluate the quality of
the estimator T = X(1) + 1 (X(1) is the minimum of X1 and X2). Conditioning on D, we
know that P (T = θ | D = 1) = 1 and P (T = θ | D = 0) = 1/2, and Cox and Mayo (2010)
would propose reporting inferences conditional on D because it is more informative than an
unconditional analysis. But now consider the following modification: P (Xi = θ+1) = 1/2+θǫ
and P (Xi = θ − 1) = 1/2 − θǫ for a known ǫ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [−1/(2ǫ), 1/(2ǫ)]. The original
example is a particular case with ǫ = 0. If ǫ 6= 0, D is not ancillary anymore, despite the
fact that if ǫ is small (say ǫ = 10−100) we are essentially in the same situation as if ǫ = 0.
In addition, if ǫ 6= 0, there are (even more) cases where we can retrieve θ with probability 1
given the data. Indeed, if X1 6= X2 we still have that θ = X(1) + 1, but now there are cases
where we know the value of θ exactly even if X(1) = X(2). Let Aθ−1 = [−1/(2ǫ)−1, 1/(2ǫ)−1]
and Aθ+1 = [−1/(2ǫ) + 1, 1/(2ǫ) + 1]. If X(1) ∈ Aθ−1 \ Aθ+1, then θ = X(1) + 1; analogously,
θ = X(1) − 1 whenever X(1) ∈ Aθ+1 \ Aθ−1. Note that if ǫ > 1/2, Aθ−1 ∩ Aθ+1 = ∅ and we
can always retrieve the value of θ. If we want to assess the performance of T conditionally,
we know that
P (T = θ | X(1) 6= X(2)) = 1
P (T = θ | X(1) = X(2),X(1) ∈ (Aθ−1 \ Aθ+1)) = 1
P (T = θ | X(1) = X(2),X(1) ∈ (Aθ+1 \ Aθ−1)) = 0
P (T = θ | X(1) = X(2),X(1) ∈ Aθ−1 ∩Aθ+1) =
(1/2 − θǫ)2
(1/2 − θǫ)2 + (1/2 + θǫ)2
,
but unconditionally P (T = θ) = 1−(1/2+θǫ)2, which depends on θ and ranges from 1 to 0 for
θ ∈ [−1/(2ǫ), 1/(2ǫ)]. Therefore, the confidence level of the set C = {T} is inf Pθ(θ ∈ C) = 0,
which is clearly undesirable and misleading (especially in cases where ǫ > 1/2, where a
conditional analysis reveals if T = θ with probability 0 or 1 depending on the data). As
an aside, a modified estimator that takes on the value X(1) − 1 whenever X(1) = X(2) and
X(1) > 0 has better performance, but we used T for illustrative purposes.
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Finally, we note that applying the ancillarity principle can be suboptimal according to strictly
frequentist criteria: in practice, there are cases where an unconditional test is preferable to a
conditional test, as in the following example inspired by an Example in Cox (1958).
Example 5. Suppose a production line is periodically tested to see if it is operating correctly.
If correct, it produces a part of diameter 1. Periodically it goes out of line and then produces
parts with diameter 1.1. In the testing, the parts are measured with one of two measuring
instruments, an old one which produces a normal observation with mean the true diameter
of the part and standard deviation 0.1, and a new measuring instrument which produces
a normal observation with mean the true diameter and standard deviation 0.05. The old
and new measuring instruments are each available with probability 1/2 (as there is another
production line for which they are also used). If the production line is deemed to be out of line,
it must be shut down and reset, at considerable expense. The company does a cost-benefit
analysis and determines that it will be optimal to control overall Type I error in the testing
at the 0.05 level. This is a scenario in which frequentist analysis is absolutely appropriate, in
that there is true long-term repetition of the test. Also, the cost-benefit analysis is presumably
carried out in a Bayes-frequentist sense, since historical levels of in-line and out-of-line must
be taken into account. If the company followed WCP, they would do the 0.05 level test
conditional on which measuring instrument is being used at each test. But this will lose
the company money, as the power of this test for detecting an out-of-line process (which is
0.646) is 9% less than that of the most powerful test (which is 0.694). This most powerful
test corresponds to using Type I error probabilities of 0.099 and 0.001 for the old and new
measuring instruments, respectively.
The example above is interesting in that it suggests that, for frequentists, the only way to
implement the conditionality principle is to use a method that is compatible with Bayesian
reasoning (as the unconditional test would be equivalent to the Bayes rule with respect to the
loss function implied by the cost-benefit analysis). This is not surprising, given the complete
class theorems that show that optimal frequentist decision procedures are necessarily Bayesian.
5 Conclusions
The articles Evans (2013) and Mayo (2014) contain thought-provoking discussions about the
conditions under which the result in Birnbaum (1962) is valid, but that neither of them show
that WCP and SP do not imply LP according to the definitions in Section 1, which, in our
view, are equivalent to the definitions in Birnbaum (1962).
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Evans avoids introducing Ev, which is central in Birnbaum’s argument, and defines statistical
principles as set relations on the (product) space of inferences. If Ev is introduced with the
property Ev(E, x) = Ev(E′, x′) if and only if (E, x) ∼C (E
′, x′) or (E, x) ∼S (E
′, x′) Birn-
baum’s result follows. If we stick to Evans’ framework, the union of the set relation defined
by the sufficiency principle (S) and the conditionality principle (C) does not equal the set
relation defined by the likelihood principle (L). This result might seem surprising at first
glance but, if it were true, two inference bases with proportional likelihoods would be equiv-
alent according to either the sufficiency principle or the conditionality principle individually,
which is clearly false. What is true is that the smallest equivalence relation generated by
S ∪ C equals L. As explained in Section 1, the equivalence relation generated by S ∪ C only
contains inference bases that are equivalent to a chain of applications of the principles.
Mayo defines statistical principles making a distinction between the output of methods (M)
and the inferences that are made by an agent using them (Ev): the weak conditionality prin-
ciple is defined as a property of Ev, whereas the sufficiency principle is defined as a property
ofM. For example, this distinction allows Mayo to claim that in a mixture experiment where
a Negative Binomial or Binomial experiment is selected with equal probability, reporting the
conditional p-value does not result in a violation of the sufficiency principle (see Example 2).
In the framework of Mayo (2014), the weak conditionality principle and the sufficiency princi-
ple do not imply the likelihood principle, but the definition of the sufficiency principle differs
from that in Birnbaum (1962) because the distinction between the ouput of methods and
informative inference is not made.
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